Bloomington Legal Newsletter: McLean County Docket

You can see what court cases are coming up in the next 14 days by visiting the following site: http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/index.aspx?NID=540

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Child Support Maintenance Fee Payment in McLean County Child Support Cases

Child Support Records Maintenance Annual Fee

In child support and maintenance cases, Illinois statute 705 ILCS 105/27.1a (bb)(4) authorizes the circuit clerk to collect an annual fee of $36 "…from the person [payer] making payment for maintaining child support records and the processing of support orders to the State of Illinois KIDS system and the recording of payments issued by the State Disbursement Unit for the official record of the Court." 

This annual clerk's fee is in addition to and separate from amounts ordered to be paid as maintenance or child support, and is used by the circuit clerk to maintain child support orders and record all payments issued by the State Disbursement Unit for the official record of the Court. 

Each year the circuit clerk's office sends reminder notices to the last known address of each payer. 

Failure to pay your annual clerk's fee may affect your credit rating. 

You may make your annual clerk's fee payment using your credit card. 

Online Payments
To pay ONLINE you will need the following information in order to make a payment: 

·         Case #

·         Dollar Amount You Are Paying

·         A Valid MasterCard, Visa, Discover or American Express Card

*A convenience fee of 3.5% of the payment or $3.50 minimum will be added to the amount of fees due for this service. Government Payment Services (GPS) is an independent company that charges this fee for its services. The Court and Circuit Clerk's office receives no part of the convenience fee. 

Pay your maintenance fee online.

 

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

How to Obtain a Copy of Your McLean County Divorce Judgment

In McLean County Illinois, copies of your court file are always available for you, either from the actual file or from a microfilm of your case.

The cost for photocopies is $2.00 for the first page, .50 per page for the next 19 pages, then .25 per page for each page thereafter. Certification may be had for an additional $10.00 upon request.

The Clerk asks that you have the caption of the case, the case number if possible, or the year in which the case was filed to assist them in retrieving your records. If you need several years searched, the cost is $6.00 per year for record searches.

Please note: Cases from the 1960's (Divorce Records) are stored at an off-site facility and it can take 1-2 days to retrieve these files for inspection and copying. Please let the Clerk know by phone or e-mail and they can work with you to eliminate unnecessary trips to their office.

You may request copies in person during their business hours of M-F 8:30-4:30, or in writing or by e-mail. The cost of all copies must be paid in advance of any mailing. Please make checks/money orders payable to: McLean County Circuit Clerk. 

The Clerk will advise you of the cost of your copies. Do not send cash via the mail.

The Clerk's Address is:
McLean County Circuit Clerk- Attn: Family Division
PO Box 2420
Bloomington, IL 61702-2420 or

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

McLean County Family Visitation Center (Bloomington Illinois)

A lot of clients need help with supervised visitation or visitation exchanges in a public place. The Visitation Center in Bloomington Illinois is one resource in these types of cases

 

McLean County Family Visitation Center

McLean County is located in central Illinois about an hour northeast of Springfield. 

According to the US Census Bureau, the 2004 estimated population of McLean County is 158,006 with a land area of 1,184 square miles. 

In 2004, 182 Emergency Orders of Protection, 13 Interim Orders of Protection and 175 Plenary Orders of Protection were entered into the Law Enforcement Administrative Data System (LEADS).

 

Development of the McLean County Family Visitation Center:

In 1999, the McLean County Domestic Violence Task Force, established in the mid 1990's, composed of community members, churches, the Sheriff's Department, the State's Attorney, victim advocates and partner abuse intervention service providers began exploring the issues of children in families with domestic violence and specifically the lack of safety during exchanges for both victims and their children.  The Task Force determined the community needed a center that would allow for safe visitation exchanges that would help protect both children experiencing domestic violence and the victim.   

The Task Force supported The Children's Foundation when they applied for, and received, a pilot grant from the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority (IVPA) to develop and implement a visitation exchange center. 

The McLean County Family Visitation Center opened September 1999 and currently serves seven families a month.

 

Program Administration

The Children's Foundation provides fiscal and personnel oversight for the McLean County Family Visitation Center.

 

Site/Location

The McLean County Family Visitation Center is located at the offices of The Children's

Foundation in Bloomington.  The facility has both a front and back entrance so parents arrive through separate entrances.  The custodial parent uses the front entrance and the non-custodial parent uses the back entrance.

The Visitation Center is open from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. Monday through Sunday where exchanges can occur at any time.  The agency averages about 12 hours a week in exchanges.

 

Security

Security cameras are located in the McLean County Family Visitation Center parking lots, building hallways and in the visitation room.  Parents are videotaped from the time of their arrival to the time of their departure.  Parents are informed of the cameras during the intake interview and sign a form that they are aware of the cameras and that they are being videotaped. 

There is a panic button on the wall and a portable panic button that is carried by the staff that notifies law enforcement immediately.

 

Funding

The Children's Foundation received funding for a pilot grant from IVPA for two years. They were notified by IVPA in May of 2001 that the McLean County Family Visitation Center would not be eligible for funding in fiscal year 2002 due to changes in prevention criteria used by IVPA.  With the loss of this funding, the Foundation's board of directors began a fundraising effort.  The Foundation received a one time grant from the county for $10,000 in 2003 as well as a two year federal Safe Havens Grant in October 2004.  The Foundation is reapplying for Safe Havens funding for 2006-2008.

Additional funding is generated from intake fees and exchanges.  The non-custodial parent is charged a $25.00 intake fee and each parent is charged $5.00 per exchange, collected at the time of the exchange.  In cases of financial hardship, a family can write a letter to the Visitation Center requesting a fee waiver or fee reduction.  Staff determines if a waiver is granted on a case-by-case basis. 

 

Staffing

The McLean County Visitation Center is staffed with social workers employed by The Children's Foundation.  Typically, one staff person is scheduled for exchanges, but if there are exchanges scheduled where either of the parents are exhibiting certain risk factors, additional staff will be added.  The Visitation Center also has students in the Masters of Social Work program from Illinois State University who assist with exchanges.

During their first year at the Foundation, new staff, volunteers and interns complete a 15 hour training course covering stages of child development, the effects of divorce, family violence including intimate partner abuse, child abuse, and mandated reporting for child abuse.  Annually, ten hours of continuing education training is provided for staff.  

 

Protocols/Procedures Types of cases

A court order is not required in order to use the McLean County Family Visitation Center but families must have been or are experiencing domestic violence, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or stalking.  Referrals may come from the court, attorneys, shelters and other social service agencies or as a self-referral from the family.

 

Procedures -- Intake

Both parents are required to schedule an intake assessment before the Visitation Center will begin providing supervised exchanges:  

The parents are interviewed individually and the following information is covered: A Client Fact Sheet that includes the names of parents, contact information and the names of the children; A Legal Information Form that includes information on any current or expired orders of protection, court orders for visitation, docket numbers and the names of any judges presiding over cases between the parties and the attorneys representing them; A social history that contains any family history of violence; The guidelines for using the Visitation Center; Each parent signs a form indicating that they have received the rules of the Visitation Center, an Informed Consent to Participate in Services, the Statement of Confidentiality, the Clients Rights Statement, and the Appeal/Grievance Policy for Persons Served.

 

  Exchange Process

The non-custodial parent arrives 10 minutes before the exchange and enters through the rear entrance.

The custodial parent arrives at the designated time of the exchange through the front entrance.

The staff will bring the child to the non-custodial parent who is waiting in the visitation room. 

The non-custodial parent will wait 15 minutes with the child while the custodial parent leaves the building.

When returning the non-custodial parent and child arrive 15 minutes before the exchange.

The custodial parent arrives at the designated time of the exchange, picks up the child and leaves.

The non-custodial parent waits 15 minutes and then leaves.

 

Records and Reporting

The Visitation Center provides reports to the court on a quarterly basis.  The reports include a summary of the services provided, reasons for cancellation of an exchange, no shows, observations and concerns of the staff and recommendations if appropriate.  Reports are filed more frequently if there is a pressing issue.  The reports filed with the court are also sent to the clients and their attorneys.

 

Other Services Provided

The Children's Foundation is a child welfare agency and part of Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois.  Services available include supervised visitation, transportation to and from visits, parenting/child groups, therapy, and an on-site crisis nursery. 

 

Data Collection

Due to the fact that the McLean County Family Visitation Center is funded by Safe Havens, the Visitation Center uses a required database from the Department of Justice that includes demographic information, reasons for referrals, family issues and the number of exchanges.

 

Advisory Committee

The McLean County Family Visitation Center has an advisory committee that meets quarterly. 

The role of this committee is to advise the program on policies and programming as they relate to the Visitation Center.  The committee includes representation from the following groups: women's advocates, child abuse services, Illinois State University School of Social Work, family law attorneys, legal services, family law division judges, physicians, the state's attorney's office, child protection, law enforcement and court administration.

 

Promotion/Marketing

A brochure on the McLean County Family Visitation Center is distributed to judges, attorneys and service providers.  The Visitation Center hosts annual trainings for judges, attorneys and law enforcement.

  

If you have any questions regarding the McLean County Visitation Center, or other Child Custody or Visitation matters, please contact my office to schedule a Consultation.

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Grounds for Divorce in Bloomington Illinois

When you file a Petition for Dissolution, you must allege specific grounds that entitle you to the relief you are seeking—namely, a divorce. In the past, a person could not be divorced without a very good reason. Now, however, in addition to legal separations, Illinois law offers divorces in two flavors: those where a specific reason is given ("grounds), and those where no reason is given ("irreconcilable differences"). The various grounds are discussed below:

 

 

Irreconcilable Differences:

In Illinois we use the term "irreconcilable differences" to describe what others know as a "no fault divorce." To be accurate, it would be proper to view irreconcilable differences as a modified no-fault basis of dissolution, because, unlike other states in which true no-fault grounds exist, there are some minimal prerequisites to receiving a judgment under irreconcilable differences. To be granted a divorce, you must prove that irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, that past efforts at reconciliation have failed, that future efforts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of the family.

 

In Illinois, to proceed using "irreconcilable differences" as the grounds for divorce the parties must live "separate and apart" for at least two years before their case may be concluded. You may file your case while you're still living together, but you must live separate and apart for two years before the case can be finalized.

 

The two-year waiting requirement can be waived if both parties sign a special waiver form. Even then, however, they must still live separate and apart for at least six months before the case may be finalized.

 

 

Grounds:

The ten traditional grounds for dissolution of marriage in Illinois are specified in 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1):

 

Impotence

Impotence is not a common or often-used ground. The seminal case discussing it is from 1912. Kinkaid v. Kinkaid, 100 N.E. 217 (1912). "Naturally impotent" means incurably so, whether the impotence is caused by a disease, a permanent physical defect, or an accident. Griffeth v. Griffeth, 44 N.E. 820 (1896). The statute also requires the impotence to have been in existence at the time the marriage took place.

 

Bigamy

Bigamy is a ground not only for dissolution of marriage but also for a declaration of invalidity. 750 ILCS 5/212(a)(1). The fact that the petitioner knew or should have known of the earlier marriage is not a ground for denying a divorce, but it may be a factor in deciding whether to grant alimony or maintenance. Belluomini v. Belluomini, 392 N.E.2d 669 (1st Dist. 1979). The statute specifies that children born of a bigamous marriage are legitimate and are entitled to the same considerations regarding child support as children of a monogamous marriage. 750 ILCS 5/212(c), 5/303.

 

Adultery

Surprisingly, there is little case law addressing the definition of "adultery" and standards of proof. Most cases seem to assume the definition and address other issues, perhaps because "adultery" has a common meaning. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 52 (7th ed. 1999), defines it as "[v]oluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person other than the

offender's spouse." This definition seems to be the generally accepted one. In order to establish adultery, there must be proof of a carnal act. Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 126 N.E.2d 34 (3rd Dist. 1955). Because adultery can seldom be proved by direct evidence, it may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

        One may demonstrate facts and circumstances from which adultery can reasonably be inferred. Marcy v. Marcy, 79 N.E.2d 207 (1947). The adultery must be without the fault or provocation of the other spouse. If the person alleging adultery was himself living with a woman other than his wife prior to the time he alleged his wife committed adultery, his wife's alleged adultery may have been provoked by the husband's prior adultery or based on his fault. See Cuneo v. Cuneo, 399 N.E.2d 1384 (2nd Dist. 1980). Note also that adultery is a crime in Illinois. 720 ILCS 5/11-7.

 

Wilful desertion or absence for the space of one year

Desertion, to constitute a legal ground in Illinois, must be against the will of the petitioner and without reasonable cause and must have lasted for at least one year. Boyd v. Boyd, 207 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1965). Desertion requires proof of "an actual abandonment and abnegation of all marital relationships with an intent not to return and without legal justification or consent of the other spouse." Lemon v. Lemon, 150 N.E.2d 608 (1958). Since it must be willful and without cause, spouses who choose to sever their marital relationship by mutual consent cannot properly assert statutory desertion as a ground for dissolution. If one spouse asks the other to return, however, and the latter refuses, then desertion exists as a ground. Conversely, if a spouse who left asks to return within the statutory period and is denied, that spouse may not be charged with desertion. Metoyer v. Metoyer, 235 N.E.2d 882 (1st Dist. 1968). Finally, if one of the spouses moves out of the marital residence and files a petition for dissolution of marriage on any ground, he or she may technically be subject to a counterpetition based on desertion once a year has passed. The time that litigation is pending counts toward that one-year minimum period. 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1). Constructive desertion occurs when one of the spouses through acts of unprovoked brutality or cruelty forces the other spouse out of the marital residence. Dayan v. Dayan, 229 N.E.2d 568 (5th Dist. 1967).

 

Habitual drunkenness for the space of two years

In Murphy v. Murphy, 334 N.E.2d 779 (1st Dist. 1975), the court defined "habitual drunkenness" as:

an irresistible habit of getting drunk . . . a fixed habit of drinking to excess . . . an involuntary tendency to become intoxicated, which is acquired by frequent repetition, — such a frequent indulgence to excess as to show a formed habit and inability to control the appetite.

 

Quoting Garrett v. Garrett, 96 N.E. 882 (1911).

 

The two-year period referred to in the statute need not be continuous, and short, voluntary periods of abstention will not affect the finding of habitual drunkenness. Bissekumer v. Bissekumer, 57 N.E.2d 521 (2nd Dist. 1944).

 

Gross and confirmed habits caused by the excessive use of addictive drugs for the space of two years

The statute itself clarifies that "excessive use of addictive drugs" refers to "use of an addictive drug by a person when using the drug becomes a controlling or a dominant purpose of his life." 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1).

 

Attempting the life of the spouse by poison or other means showing malice

It is interesting that 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1) still provides that, as a ground for dissolution, an attempt on the life of a spouse must be not only without provocation but also by a means showing malice. It is difficult to think of any means of attempting to take a spouse's life that would not show malice, but the statute is what it is. See In re Marriage of Davenport, 416 N.E.2d 88 (4th Dist. 1981) (wife's pouring and lighting kerosene on bed where her husband was lying established grounds entitling him to divorce based on mental cruelty).

 

Extreme and repeated physical or mental cruelty

Other than the no-fault provisions of 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2), this ground is probably the most common for dissolution of marriage. "Extreme and repeated mental cruelty" has been defined as a pattern of abusive and humiliating treatment, calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable the life of the spouse, which actually affects the physical or mental health of the spouse. Deahl v. Deahl, 300 N.E.2d 497 (1st Dist. 1973). There must be at least two incidents to meet the "repeated" requirement. The appellate court has defined "mental cruelty" as follows:

Mental cruelty is a course of unprovoked, offensive conduct toward one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable, and which actually affects the spouse's physical or mental health.

 

In re Marriage of Reeder, 570 N.E.2d 876 (3rd Dist. 1991).

 

In determining whether conduct constitutes extreme and repeated mental cruelty, the court is to apply a subjective rather than an objective standard. Akin v. Akin, 260 N.E.2d 481 (4th Dist. 1970). The court's function is not to determine whether the respondent's conduct would have been cruel to a reasonable person or to a person of average sensibilities. It is to determine whether it was, in fact, cruel to the petitioner.

Extreme and repeated physical cruelty is established by two acts of physical violence committed on separate occasions or with enough time between the actions so that they can be considered separate. Kovack v. Kovack, 268 N.E.2d 258, 259 (1st Dist. 1971). The actions must be both extreme and repeated, and a single act of physical cruelty is insufficient as a ground for dissolution of marriage. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 1 N.E.2d 777 (4th Dist. 1936). Slight acts of physical cruelty are also insufficient. Bidstrup v. Bidstrup, 196 N.E.2d 512 (2nd Dist. 1964).

 

 

Conviction of a felony or other infamous crime

For the definition of a "felony," see 720 ILCS 5/2-7 (a felony is a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for one or more years). See also In re Marriage of Ducey, 428 N.E.2d 1165 (5th Dist. 1981) (degree of offense must be measured by statute, and court cannot simply find offense comparable to felony and thus basis for divorce).

 

Infection of the spouse with a sexually transmitted disease

There is no appellate or Supreme Court case in Illinois discussing infection with a sexually transmitted disease as a ground for dissolution of marriage. Perhaps because the plaintiff may proceed on other grounds, or perhaps because of the sensitive nature of these allegations, this ground is rarely used. However, the statutory language is broad, and more venereal diseases than syphilis and gonorrhea are covered. It is unclear if acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) would be covered. It would seem so, but to date there has been no ruling to that effect. You should be aware that intentional infliction of these diseases may also constitute a tort, which you can plead as a cause of action separate from the one for dissolution.

 

 

Lack of cause or provocation:

The section of the statute that cites the ten grounds begins the list by stating the following: "That, without cause or provocation by the petitioner, the respondent. . ." 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1). The rules of statutory construction dictate that this predicate governs all the following ten grounds and that the petitioner, for each ground asserted, must allege that it was without the petitioner's fault or provocation. 

Conclusion:

In most cases, grounds is not a topic that should consume too much discussion. It is usually dealt with is an expeditious manner. However, it is a matter that demands strict compliance in order to be awarded a Judgment for Dissolution. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask me!

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 


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Here in Bloomington, in camera interviews are not rare, as opposed to other surrounding counties, so this new case from the Appellate Court may be interesting to some in McLean County:

Grunstad v. Cooper

Illinois Appellate Court

Civil Court

Citation

Case Number: 

 2012 IL App (3d) 120524

Decision Date: 

 October 17, 2012

District: 

 3d Dist.

Division/County: 

 La Salle Co.

Justice: 

 CARTER

Holding: 

 Affirmed.

http://www.state.il.us/court/opinions/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3120524.pdf

Court's custody decision reflected thorough consideration of evidence for custody, and did not err in granting mother's motion for directed verdict. Court was within its discretion in denying father's motion to conduct in camera interview of parties' 14-year-old child, as court had other evidence of child's custody preference. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

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Illinois Supreme Court announces new standards for e-filing in trial courts

From: IllinoisLawyer

Chief Justice Thomas L. Kilbride and the Illinois Supreme Court announced on Wednesday new statewide standards and new and amended Supreme Court rules that will allow all courts in Illinois to begin electronic filing of court documents in civil cases.

To date, only five counties in Illinois have been approved to operate e-filing systems as part of a pilot project, mostly on a limited basis. Those counties are Cook, DuPage, Madison, St. Clair and Will. The announcement ends the pilot stage of e-filing in Illinois and allows all circuit court clerks to move to permanent and on-going procedures, if they so wish.

The new statewide principles and standards, new Supreme Court Rule 138 and amended Supreme Court Rule 201, give the go-ahead to civil case e-filing while placing an emphasis on protecting against identify theft and disclosure of sensitive information. They do this by protecting personal identity information such as Social Security numbers, birth dates, mother's maiden names, driver's license numbers, financial account numbers and debit and credit card numbers. This information will be barred from documents or exhibits filed with the court—whether in a paper or electronic filing. Discovery responses are prohibited from filing as well, absent leave of court.

The new standards and rules will apply only to civil cases. They are the product of the Illinois Supreme Court Special E-Business Committee announced by Chief Justice Kilbride in June 2011, chaired by Chicago lawyer Bruce Pfaff.

"Illinois is behind on using e-business and e-filing in its courts. We know that," said Chief Justice Kilbride. "These uniform, statewide standards allow e-filing in our courts; it is no longer part of a wish list. Circuit courts may now use e-filing's greater efficiencies and long-range cost savings in addition to offering a modern way of doing things."

The Supreme Court also announced Wednesday an amendment to Supreme Court Rule 11 to allow service of documents electronically in the trial courts. Attorneys and parties must include an e-mail address for service of documents on appearances and pleadings filed in the court.

The new standards and rules will go into effect January 1, 2013. This will allow Circuit Court clerks, chief judges, judges and attorneys sufficient lead time to make required changes to court operations and automated systems. In the interim, the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, under Director Michael J. Tardy, will schedule regional meetings with stakeholders including chief judges, circuit court clerks and court management system vendors to chart the way to best move forward for each individual county.

"This is a great day," said Mr. Pfaff, who runs a law office that is essentially paperless. "Behind the initiative of Chief Justice Kilbride and approval of e-business by the entire Supreme Court, the legal system in Illinois will become more efficient and significantly less expensive to operate. Any county that wishes can adopt e-filing and electronic document management systems and start to take advantage of the power of computers.

"Issues relating to personal privacy have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court and those committees which studied the matter. Our committee thanks all of the court clerks and their staffs from around the country that freely gave their time and expertise to help us choose a set of standards and guidelines that allows Illinois to move forward."

There are several jurisdictions around the nation, including the federal courts' PACER system that uses e-filing and other e-technologies. But there are special challenges associated with e-filing in Illinois.

The challenges stem from the fact that Illinois is comprised of 102 counties organized within 23 Circuit Court jurisdictions and five Appellate districts. Both the state and the counties provide financial support for the operation of the courts. Complicating the matter further in Illinois, there are at least 12 different Circuit Court management software systems operating in the various court jurisdictions. Under the new statewide standards, these management systems have to be integrated with any e-filing program.

Implementation requires the cooperation of various entities within a county, including software vendors.

"The Chief Judge and the elected Circuit Court Clerk will have to agree on implementing an e-filing program and inform the Supreme Court that their system is in accordance with the standards and the rules," said Mr. Tardy, who serves as director of the Supreme Court's administrative arm. "Each county has different priorities, needs and resources. I expect some counties, especially those which have been operating pilot programs, will choose to go forward as soon as they can. Others may wait to see how e-filing develops in counties similar to theirs."

New Supreme Court Rule 138, which applies to both paper and electronic filings, defines and prohibits personal identity information from inclusion in documents or exhibits filed with the court and if a court orders the filing of documents that contain personal identity information, it establishes specific steps to file it under seal in a separate document.

Supreme Court Rule 201 is amended to prohibit the filing of any discovery, which often contains sensitive and personal information, and much of which does not rise to evidence at trial. The e-filing standards do not preclude an e-filing vendor from charging fees for electronic filing, but no additional fee may be charged by the clerk of the circuit court, and no vendor fee may be shared with the clerk.

Since his colleagues elected him Chief Justice in October 2010, Chief Justice Kilbride has moved to make Illinois court operations more economical, more efficient and more user friendly by implementing improvements in technology. E-filing is still underway as a pilot project in the Supreme

Court; in addition, several Illinois counties are participating in pilot projects that allow attorneys, parties and appellate justices to electronically view, access and work from the official record of cases on appeal.

The Special E-Business Committee consulted with representatives from bar groups, appellate lawyers, circuit court clerks and members of the Illinois Judicial Conference. Along with Chair Bruce Pfaff, the Committee members are Sterling attorney Trent L. Bush; Chicago attorney David M. Hundley; Edwardsville attorney Rebecca R. Jackson; Chicago attorney Vanessa G. Jacobsen; Northbrook attorney Alan Pearlman; Wheaton attorneyEdward J. Walsh; and Springfield attorney Thomas H. Wilson.

Illinois Supreme Court Clerk Carolyn Taft Grosboll and Fourth District Appellate Court ClerkCarla Bender serve as ex-officio members of the Committee.

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

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